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power incumbering the use of other consumers. The Lehman-
Roosevelt bill also provides for the construction of transmission
lines to serve the preference users if arrangements can't be made
with the owners of the existing facilities.
CONCLUSION
Federal power policy as exemplified through large scale fed-
eral projects is no longer an issue at Niagara, but the issue of
public versus private power development remains. The decision
is primarily one of personal philosophy as to the place of govern-
ment in economic activity, for government ownership of public
utilities is neither novel nor necessary.
The argument most convincing in favor of the State of New
York's position is the fact that if it were not for the reservation
in the Treaty of 1950, the parties would now be before the F. P. C.
In issuing the license the Commission would be forced to give the
State the preference. It is odd that the thirty year licensing policy
of the federal government should be changed in this case. The
situation is certainly vulnerable to accusations of special legisla-
tion.
But there is a historical argument in favor of the private com-
panies, for private capital alone has borne the risk entailed in
developing the Niagara since the first white man settled at its
banks. In fact the development of hydro-electric power and its
transmission were gifts of these private companies to the world.
W'e might also add that the area has been progressively and ade-
quately served by private enterprise for sixty years.
The power is at Niagara waiting to be used. Soon Canada
will be completing the plants they began back in 1950 when the
treaty was signed but the United States will only be able to show
endless debates and indecision. Let us hope that this Congress
will determine the licensee so that we may soon begin to realize






The complex dynamism which is the law must, by definition,
become increasingly cognizant of, and correspondingly responsive
to, forces or pressures which emerge from time to time as novel
NOTES AND COMMENTS
or recurrent elements of community motion within the body politic.
Inexorably the network of legal mechanisms is then subjected
to gradual adjustment or expansion more adequately to accommo-
date particular manifestations of the phenomena of social, political
and economic change, growth and development. Such change by
expansion or adjustment in any part of the legal system neces-
sarily affects the entire structure and therefore demands close
examination and appraisal with a view to the eradication of defects
and maximization of salutary potential. Modern developments,
particularly in psychiatry and medical science, have effected defi-
nite alterations in the areas of criminology and penology, a major
aspect of which is the unique treatment afforded, by special stat-
utory provision, to a class of mentally abnormal, but not insane,
persons called "sexual psychopaths."
A GENERAL Vnmw oF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTES
Within the past twenty years of medical and psychothera-
peutic advancement, there has been a substantial accretion of
knowledge about mental disorders categorically interposed between
insanity and feeble-mindedness. 1 In line with the basic theory of
modern preventative criminology, which emphasizes anticipation
of criminal activity by means of recognition of criminal tendencies,'
sex offenders in particular have been the subjects of widespread
special statutory treatment.' The purpose of such special treat-
ment is twofold: to protect the community, by isolating sexually
irresponsible persons; to effect curative treatment for sex of-
fenders.-
As of 1951, sixteen jurisdictions had sexual psychopath stat-
utes.5 Although many of the statutes are similar in structure and
scope, no two are identical.6 For example, in the District of
Columbia the United States Attorney may initiate proceedings un-
der the statute whenever it appears to him that a person is a
sexual psychopath,- whereas in Michigan the statute requires a
charge of crime against a defendant before proceedings to deter-
1. 1 STAN. L. REv. 486 (1949).
2. See Wis. LAWS 1947, c. 459, § 51.015 (5) which provides for confinement, at
the court's discretion, of the alleged sexual psychopath until the statutory proceedings
relating to the existence of sexual psychopathy can be had.
3. See East, Sexual Offenders-A British View, 55 YALE L. J. 527 (1946) ; Lepp-
mann, Essential Differences Between Sex Offenders, 32 J. CaRm. L. & CPImINOLOGY 366
(1941).
4. 96 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 872, 874 (1948).
5. California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Ver-
mont, Wisconsin, and Washington. See 60 Yk.E L. J. 346 (1951).
6. See Tappan, The Habitual Sex Offender, appendix (Report and Recommendation
of the New Jersey Commission on the Habitual Sex Offender, 1950).
7. 62 STAT. 347, D. C. Code §22-3504 (1951).
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mine whether a person is a sexual psychopath may be begun.8
fore important, however, the Michigan statute upon analysis dis-
closes the glaring defect of an overreaching provision for the
imposition of a sexual psychopath statute; for it should be noted
that even where there is a requirement that a crime be charged
against a defendant before proceedings are commenced, there is
no restriction of the charge to dangerous sex crimes, or even
crimes involving sexual activity. The effect of such carelessly
broad language in sexual psychopath statutes, i. e., the failure
initially to differentiate between dangerous sex criminals and those
criminals either without mental abnormalities or not inherently
dangerous to society, has justifiably been strongly criticized.' It
is clear, however, that there is no valid constitutional objection
either to a statute which provides, as the Michigan statute, that a
criminal charge must be made before proceedings to determine
the psychopathic condition of the defendant,0 or to a statute which
does not require a criminal charge to be made.'
A few statutes provide that a defendant must be convicted of
a crime before the commencement of proceedings concerning sexual
psychopathy, although again it should be noted that the conviction
need not be of a crime involving dangerous sexual aberration. 2
The inevitable consequence of the failure of a sexual psychopath
statute to have limited application to dangerous sex criminals is
the application of the statute to minor sex offenders (e. g.,
exhibitionists and "peepers"). Such use has resulted in the pos-
sible lifetime commitment of a man not dangerous to the com-
munity, of "superior intelligence", and evincing merely 'marked
psychological deviations", where the criminal charge against him
had a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment (indecent
exposure)." Improper and unwise application of the sex-psycho-
path laws may also have the lamentable result of depriving appar-
ently dangerous sex criminals of necessary therapeutic treatment
where an interpretation of the statutory language limits its ap-
plicability to minor sex offenders. 4 Due to such misuse in their
8. 25 MIcH. SrAT. §§ 28.967- (3) (Supp. 1947).
9. See Ploscowe, Sex and the Law (Prentice Hall, Inc. ed. 1951) 227; Tappan,
op. cit. supra note 6, 25-26.
10. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N. W. 2d 18 (1942) (objection based on
denial of equal protection of the law, U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, rejected).
11. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U. S. 270
(1940).
12. See CAL. IVELF. AND INST. CODE § 5501 (Deering, Supp. 1947); Plosowe,
op. cit. supra note 9, 232.
13. In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N. W. 2d 652 (1944), cert. denied, Ken-
tnerer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 767 (1946); Tappan recommends that sex offenders be
given special statutory treatment "only .where there has been a conviction in a criminal
court for a serious sex crime, evidencing the danger of the offender to the security of
the community." Tappan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 46.
14. See People v. Haley, 46 Cal. App. 618, 116 P. 2d 498 (1941) ; 39 COL. L. REv.
534, 536 (1939).
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application the statutes are sometimes considered too severe, and
many prosecutors are chary about using them, preferring to get
criminal convictions unless there is insufficient evidence to con-
yict.' Consequently, the sexual psychopath statutes of many
jurisdictions have become very nearly, if not completely, inopera-
tive.
6
Proceedings under the sexual psychopath statutes have been
generally designated as civil in nature (comparable to insanity
proceedings) primarily for the purpose of obviating the stringent
rules of criminal proceedings. Such provisions facilitate the
application of the statutes, for they allay the constitutional attack
on this type of legislation which was relied on to invalidate the
first sexual psychopath statute in Michigan (1937).18 The New
York statute, notorious for its "first truly indeterminate sentence"
provision, is distinguishable in several respects from most other
sexual psychopath laws. The sentence imposed after determina-
tion of the sexual psychopathic condition of a defendant is a
criminal sentence, not a civil commitment, and may be indetermi-
nate (i. e., from one day to life) in the discretion of the court. 19 Al-
though the act is not limited in application only to persons falling
within a vague statutory definition of "sexual psychopathy,"20 it
explicitly does not apply to persons merely accused of crime.21
Before sentence may be imposed or probation granted under the
New York statute, individuals who have been convicted of certain
designated felonies involving dangerous sexual activity are re-
quired to be given physical and psychiatric examinations. 22 Analy-
sis of the New York provisions for the isolation and treatment of
sexually irresponsible persons evidences several potential improve-
ments over other sex-psychopath laws.2 8 First, the legislators
have wisely avoided using a psychiatric term, so vague and am-
15. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRni. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 543,
552-4 (1950).
16. According to Tappan's survey, the sexual psychopath statutes of Wisconsin,
Michigan, Massachusetts, and Washington are virtually inoperative; and those of Illinois,
New Hampshire, Indiana, and Vermont are rarely used. Tappan, op. cit. supra note 6,
appendix.
17. See People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N. E. 2d 703 (1943) ; 96 U. of PA. L. REv.
872, 878 (1948).
18. See People v. Frontzak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N. WV. 534 (1938). But see Hughes,
The Minnesota "Sexual Irresponsibles" Law, 25 MENT. I-IYG. 76, 83 (1941).
19. N. Y. PENAL LAW §§2188, 2189-a (Supp. 1950).
20. See Sutherland, supra note 15, at 552; there are at least twenty-nine different,
but equally vague, definitions by psychiatrists of "sexual psychopath" given in Tappan,
op. cit. suPra note 6, at 40-2.
21. 1 STAN. L. REv. 486 (1949).
22. N. Y. CODE CRMr. Paoc. § 659 (1945) ; id. § 660 (Supp. 1950) ; id. § 661 (1945);
N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 2188, 2189-a (Supp. 1950). For a thorough breakdown and
consideration of the New York act (effective April 1, 1950. N.* Y. LAWS 1950, c. 525,
§ 26) see 60 YALE L. J. 346-356 (1951).
23. Id. at 352.
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biguous that psychiatrists cannot agree on a definition among
themselves, as a judicial standard for the application of the law.24
Second, the New York statute provides the beneficial procedural
safeguards of the criminal law to those persons coming within its
purview.25  Third, the statute applies in terms only to those per-
sons who have been convicted of acts deemed dangerous to so-
ciety. 6 Fourth, it avoids the administrative predicament of those
state laws which do not recognize an intermediate condition be-
tween psychopathy and complete recovery by providing for con-
ditional as well as absolute release.
It would be unfortunate, however, to regard even the New York
sex-psychopath law as a passe partout to the solution of the multi-
farious legal enigmas which arise upon the application of such
legislation. It should be carefully considered that although the
"truly indeterminate sentence" has been lauded as "an important
move toward an enlightened penology,' 28 it has also been critically
examined as a "threat to civil liberties.1 2  It must also be noted
that presumably, sex offenders under the New York statute are
institutionalized in state prisons, 0 and it is highly questionable
whether sending sex offenders to state prisons will do anything
but impede therapeutic treatment and/or give impetus to aberrant
sex practices.31 It is clear that unless properly administered, and
adequate facilities conscientiously provided for, sexual psychopath
statutes, including New York's, do not result in the achievement of
their salutary objectives. 8 2  It has been found, however, that in
most states facilities to care for those committed under the stat-
24. Cf. Tappan, supra note 16.
25. Cf. People v. Sims, supra note 17.
26. Cf. Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 9.
27. See 1 STAN. L. REv. 486 (1949).
28. 60 YALE L. J. 346, 350 (1951).
29. Wertham, A Psychiatrist Looks at Psychiatry and the Law, 3 BFo. L. REV. 41,
50 (1953) ; Tappan, Sentences For Sex Criminals, 42 J. C8mI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 332
(1952).
30. See supra note 28, at 354.
31. See Karpman, Sex Life it Prison, 38 J. Cams. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475 (1948);
see also East, Is Reformation Possible In Prison Today, id. at 128, 130 (1947) ; Von Hen-
tig, The Limits of Penal Treatment, 32 J. CR m. L. & CRImiNOLOGY 401 (1941). As to
the wisdom of imposing the indeterminate sentence, and the wariness of judges to use it
unless they are assured of proper administration, see Dession, Psychiatry and the Con-
ditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L. J. 319, 335-340 (1938). See also Tappan,
The Sexual Psychopath-A Civic-Social Responsibility, 35 J. of SociAL HYG. 354, 358
(1950) : "The power to hold individuals indefinitely in correctional institutions for
most ordinary criminal acts is far too great a responsibility when we are still so little
able to predict the convict's future course of conduct and when we have such small
ground for assurance that the types of treatment we employ will be more effective if
extended indefinitely. Unless it can be shown as to the sexual psychopath that it is
possible not only to diagnose the condition accurately, but beyond that to make depend-
able prognosis of his future conduct and to employ efficacious treatment methods, there
appears to be no valid rational for more prolonged treatment than is meted out to other
offenders."
32. See supra note 28, at 356.
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utes are either inadequate or non-existent, and that the "patients"
are subjected to merely custodial confinement in state hospitals."
Experience has shown that the vast demands made on psychiatric
aid under such statutory schemes, and the relatively limited avail-
ability of competent psychiatrists and institutional facilities, pose
enormous problems of administration and treatment.3 4 And most
important in our political system, it must be kept in mind that
commitment (or imprisonment) under sexual psychopath law is
I . in effect serious punishment in which liberty and due
process are vitally involved." 3 5
Finally, there is some question as to the administrative advis-
ability of establishing unique penal treatment for sexual psycho-
paths only, for often the causes of sexual and non-sexual criminal-
ity are extremely similar.3 6 Also, in this regard, it has not been
shown that sex offenders are more prone to recidivism than non-
sex offenders.3 7 Further, it has been suggested that sexual psycho-
paths may not respond to treatment as readily as other mentally
abnormal persons, and hence the wisdom of allocating most of a
state's limited psychiatric services to sex offenders is question-
able. 8 From a general view, therefore, sexual psychopath statutes
have been criticized as largely ineffectual. 39
,An important aspect of an analysis of our experience with
sex-psychopath laws is the availability of remedies to those per-
sons committed or imprisoned pursuant to their provisions. A
recent case in the District of Columbia40 has shed some light on this
vital phase of an appraisal of sex-psychopath law. Miller v. Over-
ioser is of significance primarily because it is a source of very
welcome persuasive dicta to the effect that conditions of confine-
ment under a sexual psychopath statute may, within certain limits,
be judicially reviewable by means of a writ of habeas corpus.4
This may not only directly afford a person so confined a highly
desirable safeguard against improper detention, but indirectly
33. On the experience of those states which placed sex offenders in mental hos-
pitals, see Tappan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 32.
34. See Wall & Wylie, Institutional and Post-Institutional Treatment of the Sex
Offender, 2 Vand. L. Rxv. 47 (1948) ; Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 1085 (1948).
35. Tappan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 16.
36. Abrahamsen, Family Tension, Basic Cause of Criminal Behavior, 40 J. Cam!.
L. & CaRINOLOGY 330 (1949).
37. See Tappan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 22-24; Sutherland, supra note 15, at547-8.
38. See Tappan, supra note 31, at 361-2, 366.
39. See supra note 28, at 347; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 9, at 229.
40. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F. 2d 415 (D. C. Cir. 1953). Petitioner brought
habeas corpus proceeding to test the validity of his detention as a sexual psychopath on
the ground (inter alia) of improper conditions of confinement. Held: order of District




work as a fillip toward the improvement of administrative opera-
tions and treatment after commitment. Ordinarily, of course, the
remedy of habeas corpus is used to secure total release from cus-
tody,42 and only in extreme cases where constitutional prohibi-
tions are transgressed will the courts interfere with administrative
modes of legal confinement or treatment." It has been determined,
however, that the writ is available not only to test the validity of
confinement, but also the place of confinement.4  Since in New
York habeas corpus proceedings generally will only inquire into
the court's jurisdiction to pronounce judgment (i. e., to test the
power of the trial court to try the particular charge against the
particular defendant before it), there is some question whether the
writ would lie to test the place of confinement under the New York
sexual psychopath statute. 5 On the other hand, a person improp-
erly sentenced in New York, it has been held, may avail him-
self of the remedy of habeas corpus.46 Under the facts of Miller
v. Overholser, therefore, it appears that habeas corpus would be a
proper remedy.47 In any event, it has been suggested that where
the writ of habeas corpus is blocked in New York, coram nobis is
probably available to provide adequate remedy.48
CONCLUSION
The expansion of our laws to accommodate and control the
admittedly pressing problem of sexual aberration, dangerous to
society and urgently serious to the individual, evidences grave
defects. Empirical test demonstrates the misapplication of such
legislation, due primarily to careless statutory provisions founded
on incomplete knowledge about the subject matter, and most strik-
ingly the fatal want or inadequacy of administrative implementa-
tion. As a valuable experiment, however, in a field fertile for
interrelated legislative and administrative action, experience with
sexual psychopath statutes may, it is hoped, lead to enlightened
corrective and remedial measures in an area heretofore disre-
garded or improperly provided for, and open the door to intensified
criminological investigation with a view to more effective methods
of anticipating criminal tendency.
J. A. Guzzetta
42. See 1 BFLo. L. RLv. 268 (1952).
43. Garcia v. Steele, 193 F. 2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951).
44. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F. 2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 887
(1945) ; In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242 (1894).
45. People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 550, 570 (1875).
46. People ex rel. Gray v. Warden, of N. Y. County Penitentiary, 168 N. Y. S.
708 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
47. "A person who is sentenced to a wrong place . . . is entitled to relief by
habeas corpus." Ibid.; C. P. A. ART. 77, § 1262; see also N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 204
(1944).
48. See supra note 42, at 278.
